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This paper extends the recent empirical literature on the relationship between local 
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regions in the U.S. The analysis utilizes both metropolitan and non-metropolitan regions, 
and thus avoids the possible selection bias present in previous research. The results for 
non-metropolitan regions indicate a relatively weak or negative relationship between the 
local decentralization measures and local economic growth compared to a positive 
relationship suggested by a recent study on metropolitan regions.  Results for the non-
metro regions also suggest that there are different impacts across population and income 
than we observe for metropolitan regions. 
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  11. Introduction 
 
Countries around the world, particularly transition economies, have gone through 
a significant decentralization of their government structures in recent decades. 
Decentralization is generally defined as the transfer of certain administrative and fiscal 
functions or powers of a central authority to several local authorities.  The main 
advantage of local decentralization is that local governments are more efficient (or at 
least as efficient) at providing certain public services compared to the higher levels of 
government (Oates, 1972).  On the other hand, the theoretical literature in this area argues 
that there are limits to decentralization and points to an optimal level of fiscal federalism.  
Some of the limiting factors are listed as tax-benefit linkages, positive spillovers 
(externalities) of local public goods to neighboring communities and economies of scale 
involved with the production of the local public good.  For example, there is thought to 
be a trade-off between better treatment of positive externalities through a centralized 
decision making and loss of local accountability (Oates, 2006). Unsurprisingly, evidence 
from various empirical studies shows that there is no empirical consensus on the 
relationship between decentralization and growth. 
Arguments for the benefits of decentralization and certain empirical evidence led 
to a widespread decentralization trend particularly among transition economies.  While 
the U.S. is generally more decentralized compared to most of the developed countries and 
the OECD average, there is a distinct trend towards more centralization in the U.S. states 
since 1970 (NCSL, 1997; Brunori, 2003).
1  The main culprit for this trend is the 
diminished reliance on property taxes in local financing.  There is also a recent 
                                                 
1 A report by the NCSL (1997: 3-5) shows this in terms of the percent of state and local tax revenue raised 
by state governments. Brunori (2003) provides a detailed review of the role property taxation in local fiscal 
autonomy. 
  2movement towards consolidation of certain types of local governments. A recent example 
to this is the recent merger between the city of Louisville and Jefferson County in 
Kentucky which was approved in a referendum in 2000.  There are also talks about 
possible mergers in Pittsburgh, Buffalo and other locations in upstate New York.  Similar 
consolidations were proposed in West Virginia after recommendations by the West 
Virginia Commission on Governing in the 21
st Century.  These different decentralization 
trends highlight the importance of examining empirically the links between 
decentralization and certain economic outcomes, particularly economic growth. 
  In this paper, we examine the relationship between local decentralization and 
growth using data from both metropolitan and non-metropolitan regions in the U.S. The 
analysis utilizes both metropolitan and non-metropolitan regions, and thus avoids the 
possible selection bias present in previous research. 
The paper is structured as follows.  The next section provides a review of the 
relevant literature on decentralization and growth.  Section 3 lays out our empirical 
approach and discusses the data used in our regression analysis.  Section 4 presents the 
regression results.  The last section provides our concluding remarks. 
 
2. Previous Studies 
 
Decentralization is seen as an important avenue for efficiency gains by enabling a direct 
link between local provision of services and local tastes (Oates 1972, 1993). It is then 
expected that decentralization helps promote economic growth. Numerous studies 
examined empirically the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic 
growth.  Among these Davoodi and Zou (1998) used a panel of 46 developed and 
developing countries for the period 1970-1985 and found a negative relationship between 
  3fiscal decentralization and growth in developing countries and no significant relationship 
for the developed countries.  China has been a popular case study due to its sweeping 
fiscal reforms to decentralize since late 1970s.  Zhang and Zou (1998) examined a panel 
of 28 Chinese provinces during the period 1980-1992 and found a negative relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and growth.  Xie, Zou and Davoodi (1999) found a 
similar relationship for the U.S. after examining time series data from 1948 to 1994.  
Other studies conflicted these findings by showing evidence of a positive relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and economic growth.   For example, Lin and Liu (2000) 
found evidence of a positive relationship for the same Chinese provinces used by Zhang 
and Zou (1998) after taking into account other concurrent reforms.  Akai and Sakata 
(2002) pointed to the importance of controlling for historical or cultural differences 
between observations and using a period of relatively lower growth.  To improve on the 
data problems of other studies, they used data from 50 U.S. states for the period 1992-
1996.  They found evidence of positive contribution of fiscal decentralization to 
economic growth.  After reviewing a variety of past studies on fiscal decentralization and 
economic growth, Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003) concluded that there is no 
empirical consensus on this relationship.  In a recent study, Stansel (2005) extended the 
empirical literature by examining the link between local decentralization and local 
economic growth using a new dataset of 314 U.S. metropolitan areas.  He found a 
negative and significant relationship between the central city share of metro population 
and population and real per capita income growth and a positive and significant 
relationship between the number of county governments per 100,000 residents and 
  4population and real per capita income growth.  Hence, his study shows evidence of a 
strong positive relationship between local decentralization and economic growth.   
3. Data and Empirical Methodology 
 
In this paper, we build on Stansel’s empirical analysis and extend his data to 
include both metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. We focus on determining the 
impact of local decentralization on population growth and real per capita income growth, 
because both are considered important outcome variables by policymakers. In addition to 
measures of local decentralization, we control for other influences including local human 
capital, industry mix, labor market performance, and spatial relationship. Our empirical 
specification is generally similar to Glaeser et.al. (1995) and Stansel (2005) in that we use 
many of the same control variables and use beginning period values for our right-hand 
side variables, in order to reduce possible endogeneity. Our approach differs from theirs 
in that we are interested in exploring these issues for all regions in the lower 48 U.S. 
states, not just the more populous metropolitan areas. This is important in order to avoid 
possible selection bias in the results (and resulting policy implications), because non-
metropolitan counties accounted for 16.9% (49.7 million residents) of the U.S. population 
in 2004 (using the 1999 MSA designations from the federal Office of Management and 
Budget). 
Our approach utilizes an exhaustive, mutually exclusive set of regions for the 
lower 48 U.S. states. We include 313 MSAs and primary metropolitan statistical areas 
(PMSAs) as defined by the federal Office of Management and Budget in 1999, similar to 
Stansel (2005). MSAs are (usually) multi-county regions defined around large urban 
agglomerations in order to reflect sub-state economic areas. We supplement MSAs with 
  5the remaining 2,250 non-metropolitan counties in order to attain complete coverage of 
the lower 48 U.S. states. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and sources for our data for 
both metropolitan areas and non-metropolitan counties.  
Table 1 shows that population growth has been much slower on average for non-
metropolitan counties than for MSAs during the 1970-2000 period, with the average 
MSA population rising by 36.7% while the average non-metropolitan county added 
19.1% more residents. The data on real per capita income shows that non-metropolitan 
counties had much lower income levels in 1969 than MSAs, with average non-
metropolitan incomes 22.2 percent below average MSA incomes. Average growth rates 
of real per capita income for non-metropolitan regions were slightly above MSAs during 
the 1969-1999 period, with average non-metropolitan real per capita income rising by 
46.6% and MSA income rising by 43.2%. Our measure of income comes from decennial 
Census surveys and represents money income, which differs from personal income data 
produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. One of the major differences between 
these two measures is that money income excludes payments in kind, like food stamps 
and payments for Medicaid and Medicare. Personal income data includes estimates of 
payments in kind. 
The average unemployment rate across non-metropolitan counties was similar to 
the average MSA rate in 1970, with both reporting 4.6% of the civilian labor force out of 
work. Also in 1970, manufacturing accounted 20.8% of metropolitan nonfarm 
employment in MSAs and 18.2% of employment for non-metropolitan counties. 
Educational attainment levels (measured by the share of the population age 25 and older 
with 16 or more years of schooling in 1970) were much lower in non-metropolitan 
  6counties (6.4%) than for MSAs (11.2%). Finally, non-metropolitan counties were on 
average 97KM from the nearest MSA, while MSAs averaged 86.9KM from the nearest 
MSA, measured by the straight-line distance from county or MSA centroid. 
Our main interest is the impact of local decentralization on regional growth. To 
this end we use data on the number and type of sub-state governments per capita. Our 
data, from the 1972 Census of Governments, includes the number of county, municipal, 
and township governments, as well as school systems. We express the local 
decentralization data relative to the MSA or county population in order to account for the 
large population differences across regions. This adjustment retains the basic idea of local 
decentralization, in which more governments per capita reflect a more direct link between 
the governments and the electorate, and thus a more decentralized structure. Our data 
show that MSAs tend to have fewer local governments per capita than non-metropolitan 
counties, which we take as evidence that non-metropolitan counties have more 
decentralized government structures. This holds true for all levels and types of local 
government. This reflects in part the higher population density of metropolitan areas, 
because the average number of these governments per region (MSA vs non-metropolitan 
county) is much higher for MSAs than for non-metropolitan counties. 
4. Empirical Results 
 
Our initial empirical results are summarized in Table 2, which contains the results 
for the basic growth model, similar to Glaeser et.al (1995). For the basic model for both 
metropolitan and non-metropolitan regions, we regress population growth (income 
growth) on the natural log of initial period population (income), the unemployment rate 
in 1970, the manufacturing employment share in 1970, the percent of population age 25 
  7and older with 16 or more years of schooling in 1970, and the minimum distance to an 
MSA. We include state dummies in the regressions but do not report the results due to 
space constraints. 
Our results for metropolitan areas are similar to Glaeser et.al. (1995) and Stansel 
(2005). We find a significant negative coefficient on initial period population (and 
income). This suggests that metropolitan areas with higher initial populations tend to 
experience slower population growth. We find similar results in the income regression, 
again suggesting that MSAs with high initial income tend to experience slower growth. 
We find significant negative coefficients in both the population growth and income 
growth regressions on the unemployment rate and the manufacturing share of 
employment, again consistent with Stansel (2005) and Glaeser et.al. (1995). We find a 
weak positive relationship between educational attainment and population growth for 
MSAs, similar to Glaeser et.al. (1995). Our results differ from Stansel (2005), who finds 
a significant relationship for population growth, but not income. We find a significant 
relationship only with income growth. Finally, our measure of spatial relationship, the 
minimum distance from MSA, is insignificant in both regressions for MSAs. 
The results for non-metropolitan counties support the importance of the control 
variables, but suggest that for population there is little connection between initial levels 
and subsequent growth, in contrast to results for MSAs. However, we find a significant 
negative relationship between initial income and subsequent income growth, suggesting 
that low income non-metropolitan counties have added income at a faster rate than higher 
income counties. Further, we find a positive relationship between initial period 
unemployment rates and the manufacturing share of employment and subsequent 
  8population growth. This suggests that non-metropolitan counties with more labor force 
slack tended to generate higher population growth than those with tighter labor markets. 
Higher shares of manufacturing employment are also significantly positively related to 
non-metropolitan population growth during the period, possibly reflecting the relative 
employment trends across metropolitan and non-metropolitan regions. Using SIC 
employment data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, the manufacturing share 
of jobs in metropolitan areas fell from 23% in 1969 to 11% by 1999. The share decline 
has been less severe in non-metropolitan regions, falling from 20.6% in 1969 to 15.7% by 
1999. However, a higher initial unemployment rate and share of manufacturing 
employment in non-metropolitan counties does not seem to have supported 
corresponding income gains. Our results for initial levels of population and income, as 
well as unemployment rates, are similar to others found in the literature on non-
metropolitan income and population growth, see Deller et.al. (2001). Finally, we find a 
significant and negative relationship between both population and income growth and the 
distance from the non-metropolitan county to the nearest MSA. This implies non-
metropolitan counties benefited from close proximity to a metropolitan area, particularly 
in terms of population growth (the negative impact is more than triple that found for 
income growth). 
Table 3 shows our results for the extended growth regressions, which include our 
measures of local decentralization. The results for metropolitan regions are similar to 
Stansel (2005), with significant positive coefficients on county governments per capita in 
both the population growth and income growth regressions. This suggests that MSAs 
  9with larger ratios of county governments to population tended to grow faster during the 
period and thus that increased local decentralization contributes to MSA growth. 
For non-metropolitan counties we find a negative and significant coefficient on 
townships per capita in the population growth regression (and the remaining local 
decentralization coefficients insignificant), but in the income growth regression we find a 
significant positive coefficient on county governments per capita. Overall, the results for 
local decentralization in non-metropolitan counties suggest that there are weaker and 
different impacts for population and income growth than we observe for metropolitan 
regions. 
One cause for concern in the non-metropolitan population growth regressions is 
the county governments per capita variable. We expect that this variable will be highly 
correlated with the log of initial population, because each county has one county-level 
government. Thus, in applying the Stansel (2005) specification to counties, we have 
included the log of 1970 population and the inverse of 1970 population. In order to 
remedy this potential problem, we explore two additional specifications for non-
metropolitan counties. 
First, we compute the total number of local governments per capita, including 
county, municipal, and township governments, as well as school systems. Second we 
compute the sub-county share of total governments, which is the ratio of the sum of 
municipal and township governments, as well as school systems, divided by the total 
number of local governments. Table 4 summarizes the extended growth regressions for 
non-metropolitan counties for population and real income. 
  10Overall, the results suggest weak or negative correlation between local 
decentralization and non-metropolitan population or income growth. We find a negative 
coefficient, significant at the 1% level, for total local governments per capita in the 
population growth regression, and a negative but not significant (at the 10% level) 
coefficient for the sub-county local government share. The results for real income growth 
suggest no significant relationship for total local governments per capita, but a negative 





  115. Policy Implications and Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we examined empirically the relationship between local 
decentralization and growth using data from both metropolitan and non-metropolitan 
regions in the U.S. We find it important to include non-metropolitan counties in the 
analysis since they represent 16.9% (49.7 million residents) of the U.S. population.  
While the results for metropolitan regions are similar to Glaeser et al. (1995) and Stansel 
(2005), the results for non-metropolitan regions indicate a significantly weaker or 
negative relationship between the local decentralization measures and local economic 
growth compared to Stansel (2005).  This re  Results for these regions also suggest that 
there are different impacts across population and income than we observe for 
metropolitan regions.   
  Among possible future extensions of this research, we note that it may be useful 
to examine the same relationship by including the time dimension.  Hence, a panel data 
analysis would enable us to examine both the variations in the number of local 
government units across metro and non-metro regions and also variation across time in 
these regions.  It is also useful to complement this study with additional local 
decentralization measures such as revenue and spending measures. This will make it 
possible to examine the impact of vertical dispersion of fiscal power between different 
local government units on economic growth. 
  12 
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Variable Source Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Growth in Ln Population 1970-2000* Census 1970 and 2000 0.367 0.447 -3.673 3.434 0.191 0.393 -0.982 4.957
Growth in Ln RPCI 1969-1999* Census Per Capita Income, CPIU deflator 0.432 0.106 0.165 0.918 0.466 0.166 -0.456 1.341
Total Local Govts 1972** Census of Governments 1972, CGF 63.687 85.842 3.000 815.000 15.577 14.263 1.000 109.000
     Per 100k Residents Using 1970 Census population 20.608 17.865 1.554 153.867 136.243 175.649 1.267 2,156.334
County Govts 1972 Census of Governments 1972, CGF 2.492 2.455 0.000 20.000 0.997 0.056 0.000 1.000
     Per 100k Residents Using 1970 Census population 1.008 0.669 0.000 3.941 12.532 23.677 0.000 609.756
Municipal Govts 1972 Census of Governments 1972, CGF 23.473 33.110 0.000 288.000 4.896 3.680 0.000 31.000
     Per 100k Residents Using 1970 Census population 7.210 5.339 0.000 35.476 39.031 36.717 0.000 495.050
Township Govts 1972 Census of Governments 1972, CGF 15.850 29.563 0.000 210.000 5.227 9.410 0.000 67.000
     Per 100k Residents Using 1970 Census population 5.481 11.398 0.000 104.671 42.298 107.943 0.000 1,752.022
Public School Systems 1972 Census of Governments 1972, CGF 21.872 32.102 1.000 360.000 4.457 5.207 0.000 62.000
     Per 100k Residents Using 1970 Census population 6.909 6.059 0.158 39.329 42.382 86.929 0.000 1,815.182
Sub-county Govt Share of Total Local Govts 1972** Computed by authors 0.929 0.064 0.667 1.000 0.872 0.104 0.000 1.000
Ln Population 1970 Census 1970 12.392 1.063 10.224 16.021 9.486 0.917 5.100 12.663
Real Per Capita Money Income 1969, Thous., $1969 Census 1970 2.908 0.465 1.482 4.432 2.262 0.462 0.979 4.908
Unemployment Rate 1970 Census, City and County Databook 1972 0.046 0.015 0.020 0.121 0.046 0.025 0.000 0.180
Manufacturing Employment Share 1970 BEA data from REIS-CD, SIC manufacturing 0.208 0.111 0.020 0.554 0.182 0.139 0.000 0.630
Percent of Pop 25+ with 16+ Yrs. Schooling 1970 Census 1970 0.112 0.042 0.051 0.308 0.064 0.030 0.011 0.361
Min. Distance to MSA/PMSA, KM Computed by authors using centroid method 86.938 52.895 16.512 353.090 97.015 56.173 20.411 368.584
^MSA & PMSAs defined by OMB in 1999
*Computed by first difference of Ln. Not annualized.
**Includes county, municipal, township governments and school systems. Sub-county
     government share is sum of municipal, township, and school systems divided by total
     governments.
CGF: Compendium of Government Finances
313 MSAs & PMSAs 2250 Non-metropolitan Counties
Table 1

















Real Per Capita 
Income Growth 
1969-1999
Ln Population 1970 -0.0751 * -0.0077
(0.0428) (0.0122)
Real Per Capita Money Income 1969 -0.1262 *** -0.5094 ***
(0.0487) (0.0187)
Unemployment Rate 1970 -5.2620 ** -1.9225 *** 1.6480 *** -0.7032 ***
(2.6703) (0.5624) (0.3299) (0.1274)
Manufacturing Employment Share 1970 -0.8859 *** -0.1352 * 0.1292 * 0.0042
(0.2308) (0.0753) (0.0727) (0.0258)
Percent of Pop 25+ with 16+ Yrs School 1970 0.1705 0.2687 * 1.6906 *** 0.3660 ***
(0.6517) (0.1563) (0.3030) (0.1032)
Min. Distance to MSA/PMSA, KM -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0011 *** -0.0003 ***
(0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Constant 1.5809 ** 1.5284 *** -0.3019 ** 4.7388 ***
(0.6262) (0.3904) (0.1276) (0.1860)
Obs. 313 313 2250 2250
Adj. R-Squared (R-Squared for Population) 0.326 0.340 0.386 0.523
Note: Due to space constraints, we omit results for state dummies.
^Robust standard errors for population growth.
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively
Metropolitan Non-Metropolitan
Table 2
Basic Growth Model Regressions












Real Per Capita 
Income Growth 
1969-1999
County Govts Per Capita 1970 0.1524 * 0.0208 * -0.0009 0.0004 ***
(0.0845) (0.0111) (0.0010) (0.0001)
Municipal Govts Per Capita 1970 0.0047 0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0001
(0.0050) (0.0015) (0.0004) (0.0001)
Townships Per Capita 1970 -0.0051 * -0.0005 -0.0003 *** 0.0000
(0.0027) (0.0010) (0.0001) (0.0000)
School Systems Per Capita 1970 -0.0010 -0.0019 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0058) (0.0015) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Ln Population 1970 -0.0166 -0.0397 *
(0.0391) (0.0203)
Real Per Capita Money Income 1969 -0.1006 * -0.5104 ***
(0.0535) (0.0187)
Unemployment Rate 1970 -3.6724 * -1.6160 *** 1.4828 *** -0.6748 ***
(2.0600) (0.5890) (0.3526) (0.1282)
Manufacturing Employment Share 1970 -0.8814 *** -0.1411 * 0.1316 * 0.0069
(0.2309) (0.0759) (0.0734) (0.0261)
Percent of Pop 25+ with 16+ Yrs School 1970 0.3194 0.2447 1.6675 *** 0.3830 ***
(0.6440) (0.1588) (0.3130) (0.1065)
Min. Distance to MSA/PMSA, KM -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0011 *** -0.0003 ***
(0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Constant 0.6521 1.3028 *** 0.0755 4.7436 ***
(0.4850) (0.4342) (0.2285) (0.1858)
Obs. 313 313 2250 2250
Adj. R-Squared (R-Squared for Population) 0.348 0.341 0.392 0.525
Note: Due to space constraints, we omit results for state dummies.
^Robust standard errors for population growth.
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively
Metropolitan Non-Metropolitan
Table 3
Extended Growth Model Regressions
(Standard Errors in Parentheses^)
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Variable
Total Local Govts Per Capita 1970 -0.0003 *** 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0000)
Sub-County Govt Share 1970 -0.1621 -0.0597 *
(0.1238) (0.0340)
Ln Population 1970 -0.0285 ** 0.0017
(0.0124) (0.0139)
Ln Real Per Capita Money Income 1969 -0.510 *** -0.5059 ***
0.019 (0.0188)
Unemployment Rate 1970 1.5079 *** 1.6119 *** -0.6830 *** -0.6986 ***
(0.3362) (0.3310) (0.1282) (0.1273)
Manufacturing Employment Share 1970 0.1234 * 0.1248 * 0.0082 0.0065
(0.0729) (0.0729) (0.0260) (0.0258)
Percent of Pop 25+ with 16+ Yrs School 1970 1.6177 *** 1.6306 *** 0.3935 *** 0.3679 ***
(0.3051) (0.3103) (0.1052) (0.1031)
Min. Distance to MSA/PMSA, KM -0.0010 *** -0.0011 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0003 ***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Constant -0.0454 -0.2378 * 1.2152 *** 1.2751 ***
(0.1337) (0.1408) (0.1171) (0.1212)
Obs. 2250 2250 2250 2250
Adj. R-Squared (R-Squared for Population) 0.391 0.386 0.523 0.523
Note: Due to space constraints, we omit results for state dummies.
^Robust standard errors for population growth.
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively
Population Growth 1970-2000 Real Per Capita Income Growth 1969-1999
Table 4
Extended Growth Model Regressions
(Standard Errors in Parentheses^)
Alternative Non-metropolitan Decentralization Measures
Non-Metropolitan
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